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regional wealth, tightness of a common
environmental constraint and the sharing rules
Raouf Boucekkine∗† Jacek B. Krawczyk‡ Thomas Valle´e§
Abstract
Consider a country with two regions that have developed diﬀerently so that
their current levels of energy eﬃciency diﬀer. Each region’s production involves
the emission of pollutants, on which a regulator might impose restrictions. The
restrictions can be related to pollution standards that the regulator perceives as
binding the whole country (e.g., imposed by international agreements like the Ky-
oto Protocol). We observe that the pollution standards deﬁne a common constraint
upon the joint strategy space of the regions. We propose a game theoretic model
with a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution to the regulator’s problem of
avoiding excessive pollution. The regulator can direct the regions to implement
the solution by using a political pressure, or compel them to employ it by using
the coupled constraints’ Lagrange multipliers as taxation coeﬃcients. We specify a
stylised model of the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia that face a joint con-
straint, for which the regulator wants to develop a sharing rule. We analytically
and numerically analyse the equilibrium regional production levels as a function of
the pollution standards and of the sharing rules. We thus provide the regulator
with an array of equilibria that he (or she) can select for implementation. For
the computational results, we use NIRA, which is a piece of software designed to
min-maximise the associated Nikaido-Isoda function.
Keywords: Coupled constraints, generalised Nash equilibrium, Nikaido-Isoda func-
tion; regional economics, environmental regulations.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper1 is to examine the impact of imposition of emission con-
straints on regional revenues and the national revenue of a two-region economy.
The regions that are somewhat controllable by a sole regulator will be composed
of industries of diverging specialisations. We will study the revenues as functions
of the sharing rules, adoptable by a regulator, for spreading the burden of the
constraints’ satisfaction among the regions.
The need for regulation might result from the regulator’s wish to comply with
a national emissions’ quota assigned to the country through an international agree-
ment (like the Kyoto Protocol). The split of the quota among the regions is always
a contentious issue in the context of dissimilar proﬁles of the regional industries.
Moreover, the split will be a highly controversial matter if the regions are ethnically
diﬀerent.
An example of such a problem is a disagreement between Wallonia and Flanders
(two Belgian regions) regarding sharing the pollution cleaning burden, recently
studied in [3] and [9]. In those papers, an impact of “grandfathering” emission
permits on regional revenues in a small open multi-sector (multi-regional) economic
model (Heckscher-Ohlin type) is considered. Other countries with diﬀerent regional
industrial proﬁles (most European countries, Canada, etc..) might be facing similar
problems. Therefore the problem of pollution burden sharing across regions is of
utmost theoretical and practical importance. Our paper provides a new insight
into the relevant elements of the problem within a game-theoretic framework, not
exploited yet in the related literature (e.g., [3] and [9]).
In this paper, we treat the industries, or regions, as competitive agents and
analyse the resulting equilibrium policies as well as the corresponding outputs and
payoﬀs, as a consequence of adoption of a sharing rule, for apportioning a pollution
quota to each region. What makes our paper essentially diﬀerent from the above
cited publications is that we allow for an emission constraint upon the agents’
joint strategy space. Assuming the presence of an industry-independent regulator,
we then vary the levels of the agents’ responsibility for the coupled constraint’s
satisfaction and suggest which sharing rules might be preferred by the regulator.
The problem’s setup in this paper is conceptually similar to that of [10], [11],
[16], [4], [13], [19], [8] and also [5]. The common feature is that all those papers
deal with coupled constraints games, in which competitive agents maximise their
utility functions subject to constraints upon their joint strategy space. However,
in this paper, we make explicit the relationship between a solution to the problem
and the weights, which the regulator may use to distribute the responsibility for
satisfaction of a joint constraint, among the agents. In that, we follow the seminal
work [21] and use a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution concept for the
discussed problem. Under this solution concept the regulator can compute (for
suﬃciently concave games) the agents’ strategies that are both unilaterally non-
improvable (Nash) and such that the constraints imposed on the joint strategy
space are satisﬁed.
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at 14th International Conference on Computing
in Economics and Finance, June 26-28, 2008, Sorbonne, Paris.
If the regulator can modify the agents’ utilities and impose penalties for viola-
tion of the joint constraints then the game will become “decoupled” and the agents
will implement the coupled constraints equilibrium in its “own interest”, to avoid
ﬁnes associated with excessive pollution. These penalties, which prevent excessive
pollution, can be computed using the coupled constraints Lagrange multipliers.
However, for this modiﬁcation of the players’ utilities to induce the required be-
haviour, a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and be unique for a given
distribution of the responsibilities for the joint constraints satisfaction, among the
agents. We will prove that our model possesses the property of diagonal strict
concavity (DSC), which will be suﬃcient for uniqueness of a coupled constraints
equilibrium. Obviously, the game has to possess the same properties should the
sharing rules be implemented through a political process rather by threatening the
regions with penalties.
Reports on that the energy more-intensive sector’s revenue is proportionally
more aﬀected by the environmental policy than that of its less-intensive counter-
part are provided by [3] and [9]. Our model’s results suggest that the decision
on apportioning a higher or lower energy share to a region should depend on an
analysis of externalities, which the regions exert on each other. We also report on
the various degrees of market “distortion” as a consequence of the imposition of
pollution quotas and of the alteration of the rules for sharing the burden of the
joint constraints’ satisfaction. We expect our model can help the regulator discover
which rules imply an acceptable degree of market distortion.
For the results we use NIRA, which is a piece of software designed to min-
maximise the Nikaido-Isoda function and thus compute a coupled constraints equi-
librium (see [2, 17]). We also notice that a coupled constraints equilibrium could
be obtained2 as a solution to a quasi-variational inequality (see [12], [19]) or as a
result of gradient pseudo-norm minimisation (see [21], [10], [11]).
What follows is a brief outline of what this paper contains. In Section 2 a stylised
model of a two-region country is presented. Section 3 brieﬂy explains the idea of a
coupled constraints equilibrium and the algorithm that will be used to compute it.
We present the calibrated model for a two-region environmental game in Section 5
and report on the equilibrium solutions. The concluding remarks summarise our
ﬁndings, which include the economic interpretation of the results.
2 A two-region country model
2.1 A game with constraints upon the agents’ joint strat-
egy space
We understand a country as an entity, on whose territory Gross National Product
(GNP) is generated. In some countries that have historically developed into regions,
notwithstanding the inter-regional spill-over eﬀects, the product created by one
region’s industry can be deemed somehow independent of the product created by
the other region’s industry. However, due to trade and, recently, environmental
concerns, the supply of some production factors might be jointly constrained.
2We refer to [14] for a review on numerical solutions to coupled-constraint equilibria.
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As a plausible application area for our analysis, we have mentioned in the Intro-
duction the Belgian regions Flanders and Wallonia whose industries have developed
distinctly over the last two centuries. In result, their contributions to the Belgian
GNP and the overall “Belgian” pollution are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.3
There is some evidence (see Table4 I) on that Flanders produces about 60%
of GNP using about 60% of energy consumed by Belgium. On the other hand,
Wallonia contributes to the gross product in about 24% but “burns” 33% of the
country’s energy supply. The remainders of GNP and energy consumption are the
contributions by Brussels. However, we will not consider Brussels an active player
in the game we deﬁne below. We believe that, ﬁrstly, Wallonia and Flanders see
each other as direct competitors and neither of them “cares” much about what
the regulator decides about the Brussels’ quota. Secondly, Brussels’ energy con-
sumption appears small and, perhaps, no quota will make a big diﬀerence to its
contribution to GNP.
Table I: Estimations of energy consumption and gross product generation in Bel-
gium, about 2000
Energy Use Gross Value Added GVA/En.Use
106 boe % 106 Euros % Euro/boe
Belgium 270.065 100 223 812.0 100 828.73
Brussels 14.427 5.4 42 562.5 19 2950.20
Wallonia 89.832 33.3 52 819.1 24 587.98
Flanders 165.804 61.4 128 146.6 57 772.88
In Table I, we observe that Wallonia’s usage of energy appears less eﬀective
than Flanders’ is.
Intuitively, it seems possible to keep the overall pollution constant but vary its
regional contributions and achieve an improvement of the whole country’s perfor-
mance. For example, using diﬀerent sharing rules of apportioning the energy use
between the two regions can force them use diﬀerent equilibrium strategies, which
may be more eﬃcient from the social planner’s point of view. It is the aim of the
analysis conducted in this paper to help the “planners” to improve the latter.
Unless Wallonia’s product is “badly” needed by Flanders, it may appear that
encouraging Wallonia to use less energy (especially, if constrained) and allowing
Flanders to use more of it, might be beneﬁcial for the global revenue.
3We shall omit the international dimension of the pollution burden sharing problem and focus
on the regional level. We treat the allowable emission quota allocated to the country as given and
abstract from the world market of pollution permits.
4The statistical data cited in this paper come from Belgostat [1] and [7]. The energy con-
sumption is expressed in the table in boe. A barrel of oil equivalent (boe) is a unit of energy
based on the approximate energy released by burning one barrel of crude oil. One boe contains
approximately 0.143 toe (a ton of oil equivalent) or 6.1178632 ·109 J or about 1.70 MWh. Using
boe rather than any other energy unit has the advantage that the price of 1 boe is the price OPEC
charges their clients.
4
Table II: Estimations of energy consumption and gross product generation per unit
of labour in Belgium, about 2000
Employment Energy Use Gross Value Added GVA/Empl.
/Employment /Employment /En. Use
boe Euros Euro/boe
Belgium 4 085 677 66.10 54 780 0.0002
Brussels 640 992 22.51 66 401 0.0046
Wallonia 1 093 076 82.18 48 322 0.0005
Flanders 2 351 609 70.51 54 493 0.0003
Table II presents a slightly diﬀerent picture. Here, the regional performance is
expressed in relation to the size of labour, employed in each region. We see that
Wallonia’s usage of energy per worker is the highest and the revenue generated by
a unit of labour is the lowest.5 In the rest of this paper we will propose and analyse
a few models to help politicians decide about the energy sharing rules that could
lead to a socially preferred equilibrium.6
2.2 Model specification
In this paper we consider a country of two regional industries i = w, f (we will
use for w =Wallonia and for f =Flanders) that generate output according to a
two-factor production function. Let ei denote energy input per unit of labour in
region i where7 ei ∈ IR+; e ≡ [ei, e−i] ∈ IR+ × IR+. One factor will be function
Gi(ei) concave and smooth, dependent on energy used in sector i; the other factor
Fi(ei, e−i), also a concave and smooth function, dependent on energy used in the
whole country, will represent the eﬀects of learning-by-doing, knowledge spill-overs,
externalities’ impact, interregional ﬂows, etc.. Energy will be purchased by each
sector at international price p.
If the regions are separated geographically (or constitute diﬀerent political or
ethnic “units”) their decisions about the use of energy, feeding into the factors
Gi(·), Fi(·, ·), can be regarded as independent of one another. If, for various reasons,
each region strives to maximise its Gross Regional Revenue (GRR) we should look
for each region’s input and output levels as results of an equilibrium solution to
a non-cooperative two-agent (or, two-region) game. If, in addition, the amount
of energy to be used by the entire country is restricted8, a constraint needs to be
added to the agents’ joint strategy space. In result, the input and output will be
5The last column of Table II provides a rather complex and non standard measure of “effi-
ciency”, which is the revenue (in Euros) obtained out of one boe by one unit of labour. Here,
Wallonia may appear more “economic” than the rest of the country in such per unit of labour
terms. However, given the existing employment levels, it is impossible to claim on this basis that
allowing Wallonia to use more energy would increase the whole country’s revenue.
6As said in the Introduction, we are skeptical about the social planner’s ability to enforce a
Pareto efficient solution.
7Notation −i signifies the other player.
8E.g., implied by a trade balance or the Kyoto Protocol.
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determined as a coupled constraints equilibrium, see [21]9 .
We assume there is one identical good generated by each region and this good’s
price is normalised to 1. Below we propose a model for regional revenue Πi, or the
value added by region i that directly depends on this good’s production. The two
values sum up to the national revenue.
Each regional revenue (or net value-added) Πi i = w, f will be expressed in
monetary units and modelled as the diﬀerence between the “gross” good’s value,
modelled as product Fi(·, ·)Gi(·) (multiplied by price=1), and the cost of energy
input ei as follows:
Πi(e) = Fi(ei, e−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
spill−overs, etc.
Gi(ei)− p ei . (1)
One could consider several realisations of Gi(·) and Fi(·, ·). For example,
a. Fi(ei, e−i) ≡ constant (no spill-overs, no externalities). This model would
correspond to autarkic development of the regions; however it could also
serve as a benchmark case, to isolate the elementary economic mechanisms of
regional competition.
b. Fi(ei, e−i) = (e−i)
δi (strategic complementarities). This would be a simple
formulation of strategic complementarities: region −i exerts an externality
on the other region. If δi > 0 then the externality is positive.
c. F (ei, e−i) = (ei + e−i)
δi (production spill-overs10). In essence the production
of one region depends also of the total energy used by the country.
d. G(ei) = αie
βi
i . Coeﬃcient αi is total factor productivity. If Fi(·) is like in
(b.), 0 < βi, 0 < δi and βi + δi < 1 then the ﬁrst term (“output”) of Πi(e) is
a Cobb-Douglas production function with diminishing returns to scale.
e. G(ei) = αi ln(ei). To avoid ln(ei) < 0 we shall scale the model so that ei
will always check ei > 1, see Section 4. In conjunction with Fi(ei, e−i) =
constant (see (a.)), the corresponding Πi(e) and Π−i(e) constitute (arguably)
the simplest pair of the revenue functions that retain the production-function
(strict) concavity feature.
Notice that (1) and the factor realisations (a.)-(e.) capture several basic facts (albeit
with a diﬀerent degree of accuracy) about regional economics that a game model
should encapsulate. In particular, expression (1) says it is costly to use energy and
all choices (a.)-(e.) reﬂect the fact that using energy increases output. On the
other hand, in each realisation we have abstracted from labour. We assume that
the variables are expressed in per-unit-of-labour terms.
We can summarise some features of the above choices as follows:
9Or see [10], [11], [16], [4], [13], [5].
10In this realisation, total factor productivity F (ei, e−i) is the same in both regions. This is
so because it captures total non-appropriable knowledge derived from all productive activities in
the economy, here proxied by the associated energy inputs. This specification is in the spirit of
[20].
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• if αi > α−i then region i’s total factor productivity is higher than region −i’s;
this might suggest technology in region i is more energy eﬃcient than that of
region −i;
• if βi > β−i then region i’s output is more elastic to energy changes than region
−i’s;
• if δi > δ−i than the externality produced by region −i is more important for
production of region i than the other way around.
To highlight the main features of energy usage rationalisation we will use a
benchmark model that combines (a.) and (e.)
Πi(e) = αi ln(ei)− p ei . (2)
This simple model will also help us to motivate the need for a numerical analysis
of a more complicated model. It will be the combination of (c.) and (d.) as follows
Πi(e) = αi (e−i)
δi(ei)
βi − p ei . (3)
As said before, this choice captures the likely fact that region −i (the “other”
region) produces positive externality that feeds into the production of region i.
Let Ei denote the amount of energy used in region i, i = w, f . As ei the amount
of energy used by a unit of labour then
Ei = ηiei (4)
where ηi > 0 is the quantity
11 of labour in region i.
Believing the sectors are “burning” (predominantly) oil to obtain energy, the
emissions Mi can be assumed a linear function of energy Ei as follows
Mi = κiEi , κi > 0 (5)
where κi characterises the “burning” technology of region i.
In case the whole country is striving to curb its emissions below M > 0 (where
M could result from the Kyoto protocol) the maximisation of (1) (or (2) or (3))
needs to allow for the following constraint
Mi +M−i ≤M ⇒ κiEi + κ−iE−i ≤M . (6)
If the emissions Mi generated by a unit of Ei were identical in each industry
then κi = κ−i = κ and the constraint (6) could be rewritten as
ηiei + η−ie−i ≤ E (7)
which is imposed upon the joint strategy space IR+ × IR+ ∋ [ei, e−i] and where
E =
M
κ
is the energy available to the whole country.
11Variable ei can be expressed in per-worker units, per hour, per worker·hour, etc.. The quantity
ηi will correspond to the measure of ei.
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Given our assumption that the regions are “playing” a non-cooperative game,
the optimal energy usage levels and the regional products can be obtained as a
solution to a coupled constraint game deﬁned as follows:
Πi(e
∗) = max Πi(ei, e
∗
−i)
ei s.t. ηiei + η−ie
∗
−i ≤ E i = w, f
}
(8)
where e∗ = [e∗i , e
∗
−i] and we wrote Πi(ei, e
∗
−i) to stress that player i needs to allow
for the optimal action of player −i, in deciding about her own optimal level e∗i .
A solution to (8) is such that no region can improve its own payoﬀ by a unilateral
action without breaching (7). Hence, this solution is a “generalised” Nash-Cournot
equilibrium as it is called in e.g., [19], or a coupled constraint equilibrium as we call
it. If it exists it depends on a vector of weights ri, (i = w, f) that can be viewed
as a political instrument, which the central government can use to distribute the
burden of satisfaction of the coupled constraint (7), among the players (regions or
industries). We explain this concept in Section 3.
3 Constrained equilibria
3.1 Basic definitions and properties
An equilibrium deﬁned by (8) is a coupled constraint equilibrium.
A coupled constraints equilibrium (CCE) is an extension of a standard Nash
equilibrium in which players’ strategy sets are allowed to depend upon other play-
ers’ strategies. Coupled constraints equilibria are also known as generalised Nash
equilibria. The competition between the regions subject to the energy constraint
described as is an example of such a problem. Analytical solutions to CCE prob-
lems are not normally possible so Appendix A describes a numerical method for
solving some such problems.
Coupled constraints equilibria are particularly useful in a class of problems
where competing agents are subjected to regulation. Many electricity market and
environmental problems belong to this class see e.g., [10], [11], [4] where this concept
has been applied in microeconomic contexts; see [8] for an international economics
application. In general, CCE allows modelling of a situation in which the actions
of one player condition how ‘big’ the actions of other players can be. Constraints
in which the actions of one player do not aﬀect the action space of another (as in
Nash equilibrium problems) are called uncoupled.
In these games the constraints are assumed to be such that the resulting col-
lective action set X is a closed convex subset of IRm. If Xf is player-i’s action
set (f = 1, 2, . . . F ), X ⊆ X1 × · · · × XF is the collective action set (where
X = X1 × · · · ×XF represents the special case in which the constraints are uncou-
pled).
Allowing for the above, a solution to (8) can be explained as follows. Let the
collective action x∗ be the game solution and the players’ payoﬀ functions, Πi,
be continuous in all players’ actions and concave in their own action. The Nash
equilibrium can be written as
Πi(x
∗) = max
x∈X
Πi(yi|x
∗) (9)
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where yf |x
∗ ∈ X denotes a collection of actions where the fth agent “tries” yi while
the remaining agents continue to play the collective action x∗. Note that x∗ is a
column vector with elements xg, g = 1, 2, . . . , f − 1, f + 1, . . . , F . At x
∗ no player
can improve his own payoﬀ through a unilateral change in his strategy so x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium point. If X is a closed and strictly convex set deﬁned through
coupled constraints (like (7)) then x∗ is a CCE.
Games with coupled constraints rarely allow for an analytical solution and so
numerical methods must be employed. In this paper, we will solve game (8), with
the revenue functions deﬁned by (3), using a method based on the Nikaido-Isoda
function and a relaxation algorithm (hence the name: NIRA), as explained in
Section 5.3.1.
Nonetheless, it is one thing to know that a numerical method to solve games
with constraints exists, the other is to establish that the game has an equilibrium
at all. Furthermore, since the NIRA algorithm will be shown to converge to a single
equilibrium point it would be good to show that equilibrium is unique. We know
from [21]that an equilibrium exists and is unique if the game is diagonally strictly
concave. Below, we summarise the main ingredients needed for the conﬁrmation
that the constrained game (8) has a unique equilibrium; we also formulate existence
and uniqueness theorem 3.1 for a two-player case, which we consider in this paper12.
Denote e ≡ [ew, ef ], r ≡ [rw, rf ] ∈ IR
2
+; let ρ(e, r), the “combined payoﬀ” (or
joint payoff function) be
ρ(e, r) = rwΠw(e) + rfΠf (e) . (10)
The pseudo-gradient g(e, r) of ρ(e, r) is
g(e, r) =


rw
∂Πw(e)
∂ew
rf
∂Πf (e)
∂xf

 . (11)
Definition 3.1. The function ρ(e, r) will be called diagonally strictly concave in e,
if for every e = (ew, ef)
T and e′ = (e′w, e
′
f)
T , ew + ef ≤ E and fixed r ∈ IR
2
+, we
have
(e− e′)Tg(e′, r) + (e′ − e)T g(e, r) > 0, (12)
where T means transposition.
We often call a game diagonally strictly concave whose joint payoﬀ function is
diagonally strictly concave.
Lemma 3.1. If Πi(e), i = w, f are “enough” differentiable, a sufficient condition
that ρ(e, r) is diagonally strictly concave in e for fixed r > 0 is that the “pseudo-
Hessian” symmetric matrix
H(e, r) = G(e, r) +GT (e, r) (13)
is negative definite for e ∈ X. Here the matrix G(e, r) is the Jacobian with respect
to e of gradient g(e, r).
12The original Rosen theorem in [21] is valid for n players.
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Theorem 3.1. If ρ(e, r) is diagonally strictly concave for some r ∈ IR2+\{0}, then
the Nash equilibrium point of game (8) exists and is unique.
We will apply this theorem to games considered in Sections 4 and 5.
3.2 Enforcement through taxation
Once a CCE, x∗, has been computed, it is possible to create an unconstrained
(“decoupled”) game that has x∗ as its solution. This can be achieved through a
simple modiﬁcation to the players’ payoﬀ functions. If a regulator has computed x∗
that is the CCE of a game, in which the agents’ behaviour is satisfactory, then the
regulator can implement a taxation scheme to induce the players to arrive at this
solution. This can be accomplished by the use of penalty functions that punish the
players for breaching the coupled constraints.
Penalty functions are weighted by the Lagrange multipliers obtained from the
constrained game. For each constraint, players are taxed according to the function
Tℓ,i(λ, ri,x) =
λℓ
ri
max(0, Qℓ(x)−Qℓ) (14)
where λℓ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ℓth constraint and Qℓ(x)
can be the amount of energy as described by the left hand side of (7). Symbol
Qℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . L denotes the corresponding limits (L is the total number of con-
straints13); x is the vector of players’ actions, ri is player f ’s weight that deﬁnes
their responsibility for the constraints’ satisfaction.
If the weights r were identical [1 , 1 , . . .1] then the penalty term for constraint
ℓ is the same for each player f
Tℓ,i(λ, 1,x) = λℓmax(0, Qℓ(x)−Qℓ) . (15)
Hence, if the weight for player f is for example ri > 1 and the weights for the
other players were 1, 1,. . . 1, then the responsibility of player f for the constraints’
satisfaction is lessened.
The players’ payoﬀ functions, so modiﬁed, will be
Πi(x) = Πi(x)−
∑
ℓ
Tℓi(λ, r,x) . (16)
Notice that under this taxation scheme the penalties remain “nominal” (i.e., zero)
if all constraints are satisﬁed.
The Nash equilibrium of the new unconstrained (“decoupled”) game with payoﬀ
functions Π is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
Π(x∗∗) = max
yi∈IR
+
Π(yi|x
∗∗) ∀ i, (17)
(compare with equation (9)). For the setup of the problem considered in this paper
x∗ = x∗∗. That is, the CCE is equal to the unconstrained equilibrium with penalty
functions for breaches of the constraints, weighted by the Lagrange multipliers (see
[16], [13] and [14] for a more detailed discussion).
13Here, we have ℓ = L = 1.
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4 The benchmark problem
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
We will formulate and analyse a simple problem of energy apportioning between two
regions with no externalities and no spill-over eﬀects. We will also see that studying
the solutions to this “simplest” game of requires some computational analysis.
Consider two “autarkic” regions i = w, f with the revenue functions based on
(2) (see page 7) i.e.,
Πw(e) = ln(ew)− p ew (18)
Πf (e) = αf ln(ef )− p ef (19)
where, for simplicity, we assumed αw = 1. As said in Section 2.2, we will scale the
model appropriately (see footnote 16) to avoid ei ≤ 1, i = w, f .
The regions face a joint constraint (compare (7))
ew + ηfef ≤ E (20)
where, for simplicity, we assumed ηw = 1. Naturally ηw ≥ 0, ηf ≥ 0.
To claim equilibrium existence and uniqueness (see Theorem 3.1) we need to
prove Lemma 3.1. Matrix H (see (13)) for game (8) with the revenue functions
(18), (19) is
H1 =


−
rw
ew 2
0
0 −
rf αf
ef 2

 .
Clearly H1 is strictly negative deﬁnite. The constraint set determined by (20) and
ew ≥ 0, ef ≥ 0 is convex. Hence the game deﬁned by payoﬀs (18), (19) is diagonally
strictly convex. Consequently, if we ﬁx the weights (rw, rf) ∈ IR
2
+ and compute an
equilibrium then the equilibrium is unique. The other theorems’ results, proved
in [21] for diagonally strictly convex games, which will be referred to below, are
applicable to this game.
By deﬁnition, a coupled constraint equilibrium (e∗w, e
∗
f , λ
∗) is to be determined
as the triple that satisﬁes:
ln(e∗w)− p e
∗
w ≥ ln(ew) − p ew + λw (−ew − ηfe
∗
f + E)
αf ln(e
∗
f )− p e
∗
f ≥ αf ln(ef ) − p ef + λf (−e
∗
w − ηfef + E)
}
(21)
where λw ≥ 0, λf ≥ 0 and λw(−e
∗
w − ηfe
∗
f + E), λf(−e
∗
w − ηfe
∗
f + E) . From
[21]14 we know that that for every concave game there exists a (Rosen-)normalised
equilibrium point (e∗w, e
∗
f) with λ
∗
w =
λ∗
rw
, λ∗f =
λ∗
rf
where λ∗ is a joint Lagrange
multiplier (“shadow” price) that corresponds to constraint (20).
14See Theorem 3 in [21].
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If so and by the necessity of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, in equilibrium
(e∗w, e
∗
f , λ
∗) satisfy
−e∗w − ηfe
∗
f + E ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ∗(−e∗w − ηfe
∗
f + E) = 0
1
e∗w
− p− λ∗ = 0
αf
e∗f
− p− ηf
λ∗
rf
= 0


(22)
where for simplicity we assumed rw = 1.
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4.2 Properties of equilibrium
Given rf , the coupled constraint equilibrium for the interesting case of λ
∗ > 0 is
available albeit as a function of λ∗. The equilibrium energy usage16 per worker is
e∗w =
1
p+ λ∗
, e∗f =
αfrf
rfp+ ηfλ∗
=
αf
p+
ηfλ
∗
rf
. (23)
However, these relations are functions of the equilibrium shadow price λ∗. (We
notice that the marginal cost of violating the constraint is diminished rf -times for
the player whose ri 6= 1.) To explicit the equilibrium shadow-price dependence on
the problem parameters (including rf 6= 1) one has to solve the following equation
1
p+ λ∗
+
αfηf
p +
ηfλ
∗
rf
= E (24)
which is a quadratic equation in λ∗
ηfE(λ
∗)2 − (ηf + ηfrfαf − Ep(ηf + rf ))λ
∗ − prf (1 + ηfαf −Ep) = 0 .
15Rosen [21] analyses equilibria for weights ri ∈ IR+, i = 1, 2, . . .N . We prove in Appendix
B, for N = 2, equivalence between equilibria obtained for [rw, rf ] ∈ IR
2
+, and when rw = 1 and
rf ∈ (0,∞).
16For e∗i > 1 so that we avoid negative output, p+λ
∗ < 1. To assure this result we can scale the
model as follows: choose the energy unit so that price p < 1; then scale total factor productivity
αf (and/or the labour units) with respect to E so that the ratios appearing in (23) are larger
than 1.
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The roots of this equation are
λ∗1 =
ηf (1 + rfαf )− Ep (ηf + rf )
2Eηf
(25)
+
√
(ηf + ηfrfαf )
2 − 2Epηf
(
ηf − rf − ηfrfαf + αfr
2
f
)
+ E2p2 (ηf − rf )
2
2Eηf
λ∗2 =
ηf (1 + rfαf )− Ep (ηf + rf )
2Eηf
(26)
−
√
(ηf + ηfrfαf )
2 − 2Epηf
(
ηf − rf − ηfrfαf + αfr
2
f
)
+ E2p2 (ηf − rf )
2
2Eηf
Any exact conclusions about the relationship between rf and the positive root
λ∗ are parameter speciﬁc and would require simulation. We will solve numerically a
more realistic game in Section 5 to analyse this relationship. Here, however, we can
formulate Proposition 4.1 to demonstrate a few simple general properties, which
the shadow price λ∗ satisﬁes in coupled constraint equilibrium (described by (23)
and (24)).
Proposition 4.1. In the unique coupled constraint equilibrium of the benchmark
bi-regional game (18)-(20), the constraint’s shadow price λ∗ possesses the following
properties:
a. if the amount of available energy E decreases, the shadow price λ∗ increases;
b. if the price of energy p increases, then the shadow price λ∗ decreases;
c. if rf increases, which means a diminution of the responsibility of region f ,
λ∗ increases.
d. if labour supply ηf or total factor productivity αf increase, λ
∗ increases.
The proofs are elementary and based on the analysis of (24) re-written as
αfηf
p+
ηfλ
∗
rf
= E −
1
p+ λ∗
. (27)
For example, (a.) follows from the observation that if λ∗ decreased, rather than
increased as is claimed in the proposition, then the right hand side of (27) would
be negative. Similar reasoning proves the other items of the proposition.
Remark 4.1. Notice that properties (a.)-(d.) are insufficient to claim that the
privileged player’s (here: region f whose rf > 1) marginal cost of violating the
constraint (see (14)) will always decrease for rf > 1. For the claim to be true,
dλ∗
drf
< 1. We will examine a similar relationship in the game with externalities,
solved numerically in the next section.
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Equilibrium revenue per worker (as a function of λ∗) is
Π∗w = ln
(
1
p+ λ∗
)
, Π∗f = αf ln

 ηfαf
p+
ηfλ
∗
rf

 (28)
and the country’s (total) revenue
Π∗w+Π
∗
f = ln
(
1
p+ λ∗
)
+αf ln

 ηfαf
p+
ηfλ
∗
rf

 = ln
(
1
p+ λ∗
) ηfαf
p+
ηfλ
∗
rf


αf
. (29)
The latter may grow in rf but only if the growth of λ
∗ is slower than the rise of
rf , see Remark 4.1. We will analyse the issue of improvements of Π
∗
w + Π
∗
f due to
the changes in rw and rf numerically in Section 5.
We also notice that, for this benchmark game without externalities or spill-over
eﬀects, the symmetric Pareto-optimal (“eﬃcient”) solution (e¯w, e¯f , λ¯) ≥ 0, which
satisﬁes
ln(e¯w)−p e¯w+ln(e¯f )−p e¯f ≥ ln(ew)−p ew+ln(ef )−p ef+λ¯ (−ew−ηfef+E) (30)
coincides17 with e∗w, e
∗
f , λ
∗ given in (23) and (24).
5 A game with externalities
5.1 Uniqueness and equilibrium conditions
Here we consider two competitive regions that face a joint constraint (compare (7))
ηw ew + ηf ef ≤ E (31)
and whose outputs are enhanced by positive externalities feeding into the oppo-
nents’ revenue functions as in (3) (see page 7) i.e.,
Πi(e) = αi (e−i)
δi(ei)
βi − p ei , i = w, f . (32)
The pseudo-Hessian for game (8) with the revenue functions (32) is
17The symmetric Pareto-optimal solution is when the weights for each player’s payoff are iden-
tical. Hence, we mean the coincidence with the game when rf = 1.
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H2 =

rw αw ef
δwew
βw−2βw (βw − 1)
rf αf ew
δf δf ef
βf βf + rw αw ef
δw δw ew
βwβw
2 ew ef
rf αf ew
δf δf ef
βf βf + rw αw ef
δw δw ew
βwβw
2ew ef
rf αf ew
δf ef
βf−2βf (βf − 1)


We can clearly see that H1,12 < 0. However, to determine the diagonal strict concav-
ity of the game we also need detH2 > 0. This result appears parameter dependent
but will be satisﬁed at least for “large” ew and ef . Notice that the productH
1,2H2,1,
to be subtracted from H1,1H2,2 > 0 (to compute the determinant) is vanishing for
large ew and ef ; this is so because the powers of ew and ef in the denominator are
greater than in the numerator.
We will check later in Section 5.3 (i.e., after calibration) that H2 is negative
deﬁnite. Hence, if we ﬁx the weights rw, rf and compute an equilibrium for game
(8) this equilibrium is unique (certainly, for some “large” levels of energy consumed).
As in Section 4, a coupled constraint equilibrium is the triple (e∗w, e
∗
f , λ
∗) that
satisﬁes:
αw (e
∗
f)
δw(e∗w)
βi − p e∗w ≥ αw (e
∗
f )
δw(ew)
βi− p ew + λw (−ηwew − ηfe
∗
f + E)
αf (e
∗
w)
δf (e∗f)
βi − p e∗f ≥ αf (e
∗
w)
δw(ef )
βi− p ef + λf (−ηwe
∗
w − ηfef + E)
}
(33)
where λw ≥ 0, λf ≥ 0 and λw(−e
∗
w−ηfe
∗
f+E), λf(−e
∗
w−ηfe
∗
f+E) . As in Section 4,
we invoke the results obtained in [21]. In particular we look for an equilibrium point
(e∗w, e
∗
f) with λ
∗
w =
λ∗
rw
, λ∗f =
λ∗
rf
where λ∗ is a joint Lagrange multiplier (“shadow”
price) that corresponds to constraint (31).
If so and by the necessity of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the triple
(e∗w, e
∗
f , λ
∗) has to satisfy in equilibrium
−ηwe
∗
w − ηfe
∗
f + E ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ∗(−ηwe
∗
w − ηfe
∗
f + E) = 0
rw αw ef
δw ew
βw−1βw − rw p− ηwλ
∗ = 0
rf αf ew
δf ef
βf−1βf − rf p− ηfλ
∗ = 0


. (34)
We can express the equilibrium strategies (e∗w, e
∗
f) as functions of λ
∗ for the inter-
esting case of λ∗ > 0. However, after the substitution of the strategies in the energy
balance condition (ηwe
∗
w+ηfe
∗
f = E) the resulting equation is substantially “more”
nonlinear than (24). It appears that its analytical solution is unavailable. We will
solve the coupled constraint equilibrium problem (34) numerically using NIRA in
Section 5.3.
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5.2 A calibrated model
Given the data in Table II, we would like to establish plausible values for the 6
parameters (αi, βi, δi for the two regions i = w, f) that characterise the regional
revenue functions (32) (or (3)). The two functions (32) constitute two conditions
that the parameters have to satisfy for a given value of price p.
We assume that the joint constraint (31) was not binding in 2000 i.e., in the
year for which the data were collected in Table II. Since we claim that the regions
are “game players”, we have the following two ﬁrst-order non-coupled-constraint-
equilibrium conditions
e∗w =
(
βw αw
p
) 1
1−βw
(e∗f)
δw
1−βw (35)
e∗f =
(
βf αf
p
) 1
1−βf
(e∗w)
δf
1−βf , (36)
which the coeﬃcients also need to satisfy. Consequently, we have 4 equations in 6
variables.
Additionally, we have constraints on non-negativity of all parameters, [0, 1]
membership of the exponents and that βi > δi. This means that we have not-
so-much freedom in choosing the parameters. A Matlab constrained minimisation
function18 was used to minimise the sum of deviations (squared, weighted) between
the computed and historical revenues and between the postulated equilibrium en-
ergy consumptions and the historical consumptions. A solution (without any claim
of uniqueness) is presented in Table III.
Table III: Parameters of regional revenue functions
Wallonia Flanders
α 40592 43085
δ 0.002359 0.025848
β 0.048545 0.037365
We conjecture that the parameter values in Table III, can represent a stylised
regional competition problem. As said, we make no claim on any sort of uniqueness
of theses parameters. (In particular a change of unites could diminish the values of
αi but we will stick to the “natural” units: Euro and boe.)
The calibrated game with the revenue functions (32) and constraint (31) is
particular in several respects and so will be the numerical solutions to the game,
presented below. For example, δf > δw suggests that Flanders relies on the positive
externality that Wallonia produces more than the other way around19; the inequal-
ity βf < δw jointly with αf > αw may reﬂect better eﬃciency of Flanders’ use of
energy, albeit for a ﬁnite range. In brief, we believe that the calibrated model used
18
fmincon.
19Traditionally, Wallonia was a coal and steel producer. Perhaps δf > δw captures Flanders’
reliance on those products.
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in the rest of this paper enables us to analyse coupled constraint equilibria for a
case study, which the model represents.
Notice that if p = 30 Euro/boe the revenue functions (32) reproduce the
statistical data displayed in Table II:
40592(70.51)0.002359 · (82.18)0.048545 − 30 · 82.18 = 48 332 (37)
43085(82.18)0.025848 · (70.51)0.037365 − 30 · 70.51 = 54 493 (38)
5.3 Numerical solutions
We now come the numerical set-up. As announced in Section 3, we rely on the
NIRA technique to solve for the coupled constrained equilibria. Needless to say, we
have checked the existence-uniqueness condition (i.e. the determinant of H2 > 0
for the adopted parameter values) in all our computations.
5.3.1 The algorithm
The algorithm relies on the Nikaido-Isoda function which transforms the complex
process of solving a (constrained) game into a far simpler (constrained) optimisation
problem.
Definition 5.1. Let Πi be the payoff function for player i, X a collective strategy
set as before and ri > 0 be a given weighting
20 of player i.The Nikaido-Isoda function
Ψ : X ×X → IR is defined as
Ψ(x,y) =
F∑
i=1
ri[Πi(yi|x)−Πi(x)] (39)
Notice that (see [22]).
Ψ(x,x) ≡ 0 x ∈ X. (40)
Each summand from the Nikaido-Isoda function can be thought of as the im-
provement in payoﬀ a player will receive by changing his action from xi to yi while
all other players continue to play according to x. Therefore, the function repre-
sents the sum of these improvements in payoﬀ. Note that the maximum value this
function can take, for a given x, is always nonnegative. The function is everywhere
non-positive when either x or y is a Nash equilibrium point, since in an equilibrium
situation no player can make any improvement to their payoﬀ. Consequently, each
summand in this case can be at most zero at the Nash equilibrium point (see [16]).
When the Nikaido-Isoda function cannot be made (signiﬁcantly) positive for a
given y, we have (approximately) reached the Nash equilibrium point. This obser-
vation is used to construct a termination condition for the relaxation algorithm,
20The weights were introduced in the context of formula (8), see the discussion after this formula
on page 8. As said, they can be viewed as a political instrument the regulator might use to
apportion the responsibility to the generators for the joint constraints’ satisfaction (which might
be distributed over periods, if the game was dynamic, see [6]).
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which is used to min-maximise Ψ. An ε is chosen such that, when
max
y∈IRm
Ψ(xs,y) < ε, (41)
(where xs is the s-th iteration approximation of x∗) the Nash equilibrium would be
achieved to a suﬃcient degree of precision [16].
The relaxation algorithm can be forumlated as follows. Let the vector Z(x)
gives the ‘best move’ of each player when faced with the collective action x.
Definition 5.2. The optimum response function at point x is
Z(x) ∈ argmax
y∈X
Ψ(x,y). (42)
The relaxation algorithm iterates the function Ψ to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium of
a game. It starts with an initial estimate of the Nash equilibrium and iterates from
that point towards Z(x) until no more improvement is possible. At such a point
every player is playing their optimum response to every other player’s action and the
Nash equilibrium is reached. The relaxation algorithm, when Z(x) is single-valued,
is
xs+1 = (1− αs)x
s + αsZ(x
s) 0 < αs ≤ 1 (43)
s = 0, 1, 2, . . .
From the initial estimate, an iterate step s+1 is constructed by a weighted average
of the players’ improvement point Z(xs) and the current action point xs. Given
concavity assumptions (see [22], [16]), this averaging ensures convergence to the
Nash equilibrium by the algorithm. By taking a suﬃcient number of iterations of
the algorithm, the Nash equilibrium x∗ can be determined with a speciﬁed precision.
We observe that the “sum of improvements” in Ψ (39) depends on the weighting
vector r = (ri)i∈F . Consequently, a manifold of equilibria indexed by r is expected
to exist. However, for a given r and diagonal strict concavity of
∑
i∈F riΠi(xi),
uniqueness of equilibrium x∗ is guaranteed, see [21] and [11]. In particular, Theorem
A.1 in the appendix shows that NIRA converges to the unique equilibrium, for the
value of r that was used in the deﬁnition of Ψ.
5.3.2 Sharing the constraint’s burden in solidarity or the “status quo”
solutions
We are interested to know how the regions respond to the imposition of the energy
constraint (31). We will assume that the revenue functions’ coeﬃcients proposed in
Table III do not depend on the energy use and solve the coupled constraint game
(34) numerically for several values of E. We will keep the price p constant for these
experiments.21
21In real life, a higher price of energy would cause the value added to increase. Our regional
revenue model (32) does not allow for this effect so, the assumption of a constant price might
correspond to the value added expressed in constant prices. Also, should the price increase
substantially the constraint would not be binding.
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In this section we examine the regions’ reaction to the imposition of the energy
constraint under the assumption that they share the responsibility for the con-
straint’s satisfaction in solidarity i.e., the weights are rw = rf = 1. To see the scope
for the regulator’s interventions we will analyse this competitive solution against
the symmetric Pareto-optimal (“eﬃcient”) solution.
In the ﬁgures that follow the solid lines correspond to the former while the dotted
lines represent the latter. We will use an upper bar ¯ to denote the Pareto optimal
solutions; asterisk ∗ will be used for coupled constraint equilibrium solutions.
Figure 1, scaled in Euro per-unit-of-labour, and Figure 2, in Euro, show how
the regional and national revenues change when energy constraints are introduced.
The horizontal axis represents the energy availability so, tightening of the constraint
corresponds to “moving” from right to left.
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Figure 1: Revenue per unit of labour as a function of the energy constraint.
The bottom panel in each ﬁgure corresponds to the value added of Wallonia,
the middle one represents the Flanders’ value and the top graph is the sum of both
and is meant to describe Belgium’s (total) national revenue22.
22As said in Section 2.1 we neglect the contributions of Brussels.
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Figure 2: Total revenue as a function of the energy constraint.
As expected, all revenues diminish if the available energy decreases. However,
under the eﬃcient solution, Wallonia is supposed to increase its contributions to
the national revenue. This would be a result of assigning Wallonia a higher share
of the energy consumption, as shown in Figure 3. (We notice that the constraint
becomes active at E = 2.5 ·108 for the competitive solutions. The eﬃcient solutions
rely always on the whole energy quota, see Figure 5.)
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Figure 3: Wallonia’s and Flanders’ energy usage shares as functions of the energy
constraints.
A higher energy share apportioned to Wallonia might be “required” for the
revenue maximisation because Wallonia’s positive externality is “needed” for Flan-
ders’ output. Also, notice that under the Pareto optimal solution, Flanders’ revenue
per-unit-of-labour per-energy-input, see Figure 4, is growing faster than Wallonia’s.
This appears to compensate a possible decrease of Flander’s output due to a more
20
favourable treatment of Wallonia.
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Figure 4: Wallonia’s and Flanders’ revenue generation eﬃciency as functions of the
energy constraints.
It is interesting to notice that the competitive solutions are not only ineﬃcient
regarding the revenues they can generate but also in terms of the constraint’s satu-
ration. Figure 5 shows the constraint’s slacks as the constraints are tightened. It is
clear that the constraint is not binding for E > 250 000 000 boe for the competitive
solutions. Conversely, the regions always work to their “full capacity” if a Pareto
optimal solution is implemented, see the dotted line at the level of zero.
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Figure 5: The constraint’s slack as a function of tightening the constraints.
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Finally, it is interesting to compare the shadow prices for the competitive and
eﬃcient solutions. Figure 6 documents that higher prices are needed to support
the Pareto symmetric optimal solution, than for a game equilibrium.
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Figure 6: The shadow prices as functions of the energy constraints.
The observation about high shadow prices required for more socially acceptable
outcomes will be exploited in the following section. By increasing one weight (rw or
rf) the responsibility for the constraint’s satisfaction will be lessen for one region.
This will encourage this region to consume more energy. If this is the “right” region,
the total revenue might increase in a new equilibrium.
We will see that an unequal weighting scheme rw = 1, rf 6= 1, (rf > 0) can
produce a higher common-constraint shadow price and help the equilibrium become
closer to the optimal solution.
5.3.3 Asymmetrical sharing rules
Here, we compute the regions’ reactions to imposition of an energy constraint when
the responsibility for the constraint’s satisfaction is distributed unevenly. In par-
ticular, we will construct constrained equilibria when the marginal cost of violating
the energy constraint for Flanders will be weighted by a series of
1
rf
as follows
1
rf
: = 3, 2, 1.5, 1,
3
4
,
1
2
,
1
3
.
Obviously, these weights correspond to
rf : =
1
3
,
1
2
,
3
4
, 1, 1.5, 2, 3 .
The other region’s weight23 will be kept rw = 1.
23See footnote 15 and Appendix B.
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Most of the results in this section will be presented in three-dimensional spaces
where the ﬁrst dimension is rf ∈
{
1
3
,
1
2
,
3
4
, 1, 1.5, 2, 3
}
and the second dimension is
the available energy E ∈ [1.5, 3]×108boe. The variable of interest will be presented
in the third dimension.
Inspired by the observation that the shadow price for the symmetric Pareto
optimal solution dominates the equilibrium shadow price (see Figure 6) we will
examine whether varying rf can indeed generate λ
∗ that would resemble λ¯.
To help interpret the following 3D graphs we ﬁrst show how the Pareto solution
shadow price known from 6 can be represented in 3D, see Figure 7. In essence, this
is the top line in Figure 6 (either panel) shown as a surface where all iso-lines are
parallel to rf (ﬁrst dimension).
0
1
2
3
1.5
2
2.5
x 10
8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x 10
−5
r
f
Pareto efficient shadow prices
energy constraint
Figure 7: The symmetric Pareto optimal shadow prices in 3D.
This surface could be added as a “ceiling” to the following 3D graphs in Figure
8. However, we will not “cover” this ﬁgure, neither will add ceilings to the other
graphs, as this could blur the analysis. Instead, we will make occasional references
to the respective symmetric Pareto solutions, represented by the dotted lines in
Figures 2- 6.
What we show in Figure 8 is how the equilibrium shadow prices λ∗ change in
rf , and in E, for Wallonia (left panel) and Flanders (right panel). The red dotted
lines represent the symmetric equilibrium shadow prices (i.e., rf = 1 as in Figure
6).
The shadow price for Flanders is
λ∗
rf
while for Wallonia it is just λ∗. We can
clearly see that λ∗ increases as rf rises. A comparison between the values reached by
λ¯ in Figure 7 and λ∗ in Figure 8 (left panel) suggests that varying rf might diminish
the diﬀerence λ¯−λ∗. Consequently, some equilibria might be socially more desirable
than some other equilibria. We will verify this conjecture by examining the total
revenue for the country as a function of rf (see Figure 9).
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Figure 8: The equilibrium shadow prices as functions of the weight rf and the
energy constraints.
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Figure 9: Total revenue of the country as a function of the weight rf and the energy
constraints.
We can see in Figure 9 that the total revenue increases in
1
rf
. This corresponds
to shifting the responsibility for the constraint’s satisfaction away from Wallonia
and allowing it to consume more energy. In the context of higher energy eﬃciency
of Flanders vis-a-vis Wallonia, this might be a surprising conclusion.
However, Figure 10 shows that decreasing rf ∈ [0.005, 3] improves total rev-
enue24 Πw(·) + Πf (·) of the entire country. Indeed, this revenue achieved as the
sum of the regional equilibrium revenues for rf = 0.05 is “eﬃcient” i.e., equal to
24Remember that Πw(·),Πf (·) are revenues per unit of labour, see the explanation after item
(e.) on page 6.
24
the symmetric Pareto optimal revenue (i.e., achieved for α = 0.5). We conjec-
ture that while there may be pairs of (Π∗w(rf ),Π
∗
f(rf)) that correspond to other
Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes, the map α rf is not necessarily 1:1, see [15].
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Figure 10: Total revenue per unit of labour as a function of the weight rf .
Let us now examine what outcomes are caused by the variation of rf at the
regional level.
Figure 11 shows the regional revenues’ dependence on rf and E. We observe
that the preferential treatment of Wallonia (small rf) suits both regions well, albeit
Wallonia appears to gain more.
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Figure 11: The regional revenues per unit of labour as functions of the weight rf
and the energy constraints.
Of great interest is to examine the regional equilibrium strategies, which lead to
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the above revenue outcomes. Figure 12 shows the strategic decisions of how much
energy should be consumed per unit of labour in regions.
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Figure 12: The regional strategies boe/labour as functions of the weight rf and the
energy constraints.
Here we can see that increasing weight rf encourages Flanders to use more
energy while lowering it pushes Wallonia to consume more. These tendencies are
even more visible when we observe the energy consumption shares in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: The regional energy consumption shares as functions of the weight rf
and the energy constraints.
Finally we can remark that the coupled constrained equilibria are “eﬃcient” in
that the slack on the constraint is zero, see Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Constraint slack as a function of the weight rf and the energy constraints.
5.3.4 A variation in the reliance on externality
In our model, the existence of inter-regional externalities is a fundamental ingre-
dient of the problem: depending on the size of the positive externality exerted
by the energy-less-eﬃcient region on the more eﬃcient one, the latter should be
apportioned a higher or a lower energy share.
Compare the following ﬁgures (Figures 15 and 16), obtained for a decreased
reliance of Flanders on the positive externality produced by Wallonia (δf = .002),
with Figures 9 and 11.
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Figure 15: Total revenue of the country as a function of the weight rf and the
energy constraints.
We can clearly see that, now, a preferential treatment of Flanders (i.e., rf
increases) results in higher energy consumption by this region. In consequence, the
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Figure 16: The regional revenues per unit of labour as functions of the weight rf
and the energy constraints.
maximum of Πw(·) + Πf(·) in rf is not so heavily skewed in favour of Wallonia; we
refer to Figures 11 and 10 where the maximum is achieved for rf ≈ 0.05.
Figure 17 shows that rf = 1 maximises total revenue Πw(·)+Πf(·). Indeed, this
revenue is “eﬃcient” i.e., equal to a Pareto optimal revenue, maximised for α = 0.5
(symmetric).
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Figure 17: Total revenue per unit of labour as a function of the weight rf .
We wrap up this section by saying that the regulator can produce an array of
equilibria, which depend on rf , for a given level of externality reliance. For the
considered model, these equilibria include one that generates the revenues, which
equal the symmetric (i.e., α = 0.5) Pareto eﬃcient ones.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a novel methodological approach to regional cost sharing of
environmental regulation. The framework is game theoretic, based on the concept
of coupled constraint equilibrium, allowing us to formulate naturally an important
policy problem of national governments in multi-regional countries. The problem
is timely and concerns the implementation of international agreements like the
Kyoto Protocol. In particular, there are two speciﬁc questions that our model
helps answer: how to eﬃciently share the burden of environment regulations (like
emissions quotas) across regions? And, how to enforce such a sharing?
The problem is particularly acute when there exist signiﬁcant structural diﬀer-
ences across regions. In the case considered in our paper, regions may diﬀer in their
energy eﬃciency. For example, a region may be (for many good reasons) much more
energy intensive than another region(s). If the national government has to allocate
emission permits across the regions, what could be the most eﬃcient sharing rule
for the country?
In order to give substance to this discussion, we have considered the case Wallo-
nia vs. Flanders. Wallonia is traditionally signiﬁcantly more energy intensive than
Flanders while the contribution of the latter to Belgian GDP is clearly larger.
It could be thought that having to enforce a national pollution norm, in ac-
cordance with international agreements, the regulator should penalise the more
polluting, or deviating, region, especially if its contribution to national wealth is
markedly lower than that of the less polluting region(s). This is clearly the case
of Wallonia in Belgium. Our paper makes a point in this respect: the reasoning
that leads to limiting Wallonia’s energy use, does not take into account the fact
that regions do interact in several meaningful ways such that penalising the more
deviating region (from an energy-eﬃciency norm) may turn out to be ineﬃcient in
terms of the joint production maximisation. In our model, the existence of inter-
regional externalities is a fundamental ingredient of the story. We surmise that the
decision of apportioning the higher, or the lower, energy share to the more eﬃcient,
or disciplined, region must depend on the size of the positive externality exerted by
the more deviating region on the former.
Hence, there is no simple theorem for eﬃcient regulation of cost sharing across
regions. One has not only to look at the diﬀerences in factor intensity but also to
scrutinise the economic interactions between regions, which is far from easy. Even if
one restricts these interactions to inter-regional technological spillovers, the issue is
not so simple since a substantial part of these spillovers is intangible. Our analysis
points at a further and more political ingredient: the government may choose an
uneven distribution (across regions) of the responsibility for the joint constraint
satisfaction to force a particular outcome.
Our paper shows clearly that the shape of equilibria identiﬁed and the cor-
responding national revenues tightly depend on the parameter rf . This opens a
further important line of research: what could be an optimal 25 value of rf? Our
numerical analysis sheds light on some particular properties of our model in this
25In “real-life”, the government might add other criteria to maximisation of the current total
revenue when choosing a value of rf . For example, rf may need to be greater than one resulting
from Figures 2 and 9, if the government wanted region w to restructure.
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respect. Our ambition is to provide a more general appraisal using less speciﬁc
models, which seems to us crucial in the design of environmental regulation poli-
cies.
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Appendix
A Convergence of NIRA
A weakly convex-concave function is a bivariate function that exhibits weak con-
vexity in its ﬁrst argument and weak concavity in its second argument. The next
three deﬁnitions (see [18] or [22]) formalise this notion.26 As Theorem A.1 (the con-
vergence theorem) will document, weak convex-concavity of a function is a crucial
assumption needed for convergence of a relaxation algorithm to a coupled con-
straints equilibrium.
Let X be a convex closed subset of the Euclidean space IRm and f a continuous
function f : X → IR.
Definition A.1. A function of one argument f(x) is weakly convex on X if there
exists a function r(x,y) such that ∀x,y ∈ X
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≥ f(αx+ (1− α)y) + α(1− α)r(x,y) (44)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and r(x,y)
‖x−y‖
→ 0 as ‖x− y‖ → 0 ∀x ∈ X.
Definition A.2. A function of one argument f(x) is weakly concave on X if there
exists a function µ(x,y) such that, ∀x,y ∈ X
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≤ f(αx+ (1− α)y) + α(1− α)µ(x,y) (45)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and µ(x,y)
‖x−y‖
→ 0 as ‖x− y‖ → 0 ∀x ∈ X.
Example: The convex function f(x) = x2 is weakly concave (see [16]) but the convex
function f(x) = |x| is not.
Now take a bivariate function Ψ : X × X → IR deﬁned on a product X × X,
where X is a convex closed subset of the Euclidean space IRm.
Definition A.3. A function of two vector arguments, Ψ(x,y) is referred to as
weakly convex-concave if it satisfies weak convexity with respect to its first argument
and weak concavity with respect to its second argument.
The functions r(x,y; z) and µ(x,y; z) were introduced with the concept of weak
convex-concavity and are called the residual terms. Notice that smoothness of
Ψ(z,y) is not required. However, if Ψ(x,y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to both arguments on X ×X, the residual terms satisfy (see [16])
r(x,y;y) = 1
2
〈A(x,x)(x− y),x− y〉+ o1(‖x− y‖
2) (46)
and
µ(y,x;x) = 1
2
〈B(x,x)(x− y),x− y〉+ o2(‖x− y‖
2) (47)
26Recall the following elementary definition: a function is “just” convex ⇐⇒
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≥ f
(
αx + (1− α)y
)
, α ∈ [0, 1].
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where A(x,x) = Ψxx(x,y)|y=x is the Hessian of the Nikaido-Isoda function with
respect to the ﬁrst argument and B(x,x) = Ψyy(x,y)|y=x is the Hessian of the
Nikaido-Isoda function with respect to the second argument, both evaluated at
y = x.
To prove the inequality of condition (e) of Theorem A.1 (the convergence theo-
rem, below) under the assumption that Ψ(x,y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
it suﬃces to show that
Q(x,x) = A(x,x)− B(x,x) (48)
is strictly positive deﬁnite.
Theorem A.1 (Convergence theorem). There exists a unique normalised Nash
equilibrium point to which the algorithm (43) converges if:
a. X is a convex, compact subset of IRm,
b. the Nikaido-Isoda function Ψ : X × X → IR is a weakly convex-concave
function and Ψ(x,x) = 0 for x ∈ X ,
c. the optimum response function Z(x) is single valued and continuous on X,
d. the residual term r(x,y; z) is uniformly continuous on X w.r.t. z for all
x,y ∈ X ,
e. the residual terms satisfy
r(x,y;y)− µ(y,x;x) ≥ β(‖x− y‖) , x,y ∈ X (49)
where β(0) = 0 and β is a strictly increasing function (i.e., β(t2) > β(t1) if
t2 > t1),
f. the relaxation parameters αs satisfy
• either (non-optimised step)
(a) αs > 0,
(b)
∑∞
s=0 αs =∞,
(c) αs → 0 as s→∞.
• or (optimised step)
αs = arg min
α∈[0,1)
{
max
y∈X
Ψ(x(s+1)(α),y)
}
. (50)
Proof. See [16] for a proof.
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B Rosen’s weights in IR2+
Consider a game with payoﬀs Π1(e),Π2(e) that satisfy (12) (diagonal strict concav-
ity). So, we know that this game has a unique equilibrium for a choice of r1, r2.
The equilibrium ﬁst order conditions are
∂Π1(e)
∂e1
= −
λ(r1, r2)
r1
∂Π2(e)
∂e2
= −
λ(r1, r2)
r2


(51)
where λ ≥ 0 is the shadow price of the common constraint of type (7). We notice
that conditions (51) are equivalent to
∂Π1(e)
∂e1
= −
λ(r, 1)
r
∂Π2(e)
∂e2
= −λ(r, 1)


(52)
if
λ(r1, r2)
r1
=
λ′(r, 1)
r
λ(r1, r2)
r2
= λ′(r, 1)


. (53)
The above is true if
r ≡
r1
r2
. (54)
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